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Abstract This paper reﬂects on the relationship between theory and practice in
bioethics, by using various concepts drawn from debates on innovation in healthcare
research—in particular debates around how best to connect up blue skies ‘basic’
research with practical innovations that can improve human lives. It argues that it is
a mistake to assume that the most difﬁcult and important questions in bioethics are
the most abstract ones, and also a mistake to assume that getting clear about abstract
cases will automatically be of much help in getting clear about more complex cases.
It replaces this implicitly linear model with a more complex one that draws on the
idea of translational research in healthcare. On the translational model, there is a
continuum of cases from the most simple and abstract (thought experiments) to the
most concrete and complex (real world cases). Insights need to travel in both
directions along this continuum—from the more abstract to the more concrete and
from the more concrete to the more abstract. The paper maps out some difﬁculties in
moving from simpler to more complex cases, and in doing so makes recommen-
dations about the future of bioethics.
Keywords Translational research  Ideal theory  Thought experiments  Empirical
bioethics  Complexity  External validity
1 Introduction
Bioethics is often thought to be subject to two competing aims, which we can refer
to as the theoretical and the practical. The theoretical aim is to arrive at correct (or at
least well justiﬁed) answers to normative questions such as whether it is ever
ethically acceptable for a doctor to prescribe a deceptive placebo to a patient, or
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closer to some normatively justiﬁed state of affairs—perhaps by making it easier to
get compulsory licenses for essential medicines, or by implementing a particular
policy to reduce health inequities.
The two aims seem to pull bioethicists in different directions, because it is
plausible to think that the most effective means of pursuing the theoretical aim will
be relatively ineffective in pursuing the practical aim, and vice versa. This apparent
conﬂict arises much more strongly for bioethics than it does, say, for political
philosophy. In part this is because the questions that bioethics deals with are often
much more obviously shaped by our present concerns than those in political
philosophy, and in part it is because there is no more applied academic discipline
than bioethics that stands in the relationship to it that political science and political
theory stand to political philosophy. In brief, we tend to approach bioethics with the
goal of improving our grip on real world ethical questions, and in working out what
we should do all things considered, the buck stops with it.
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant reason for the lack of congruence between the
theoretical and the practical aims is that public ethical discourse relies much more
on narratives and systems of analogies than on rigorous normative arguments.
Persuading others to think of a problem within a certain frame is usually much more
practically effective than presenting a cogent normative argument that has no
obvious connection to any existing policy frames or narratives.
1 Overwhelmingly,
the frame that is put on an issue determines the arguments that will have political
currency, rather than vice versa. For this reason, much political debate consists in
telling stories that encourage citizens to apply one rather than another pre-existing
frame to the problem—seeing the situation for example as one of protecting our
national security or of preventing the construction of a Big Brother state.
However, the best means of supporting or refuting particular ethical claims
appears to be rigorous normative arguments. Unfortunately rigorous normative
arguments are usually sufﬁciently complex, unintuitive, or contextually irrelevant,
that they are largely ignored by citizens and by policymakers. Moreover, both
politicians and ordinary citizens tend to be suspicious of the idea that bioethicists
have any expertise to which they ought to defer, either in regards to bioethical
methodology or in the substantive conclusions they reach. Insofar as theoretical
bioethical claims do inﬂuence policy, the analysis that makes its way into policy
will usually be markedly less sophisticated than what one would see in a high
quality ethics journal, and will be deployed most often in the manner of means-end
or speciﬁcatory reasoning, whereby the frame sets the end, and the argument draws
out the implications of this framing for the issue at hand.
Existing political frames and narratives differ signiﬁcantly between societies. A
normative argument that is practically effective in one context, or in one
community, will not necessarily gain policy traction in another. Thus, successfully
pursuing the practical aim requires a much greater attention to context than
successfully pursuing the theoretical aim. Montgomery (2013) provides a good
1 For accessible introductions to some of the literature that supports this claim, see for example Lakoff
(1996), Westen (2008).
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decided not to recommend a change in policy from ‘opt in’ to ‘opt out’ for organ
donation—despite seeing the potential rationale for an opt-out policy. One of the
factors that swayed them against recommending an opt-out policy was the fact that
the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, made public his support for such a policy.
Unfortunately, Brown was at the time so unpopular that his support for the policy
made it markedly more difﬁcult for the Taskforce to recommend it. The Taskforce
came to the conclusion that if they advocated an opt out policy, seemingly on the
back of Brown’s views, it was likely that this would undermine the consensus they
needed to achieve for many of their other recommendations to be successful. They
therefore decided against recommending an opt-out policy.
2
Pursuing the theoretical aim will typically involve making ﬁne distinctions whose
necessity will only become obvious once one has studied the area in depth. Research
questions in academic bioethics often thus have (or can appear to have) a fractal
quality: however much we zoom into a particular debate, there is still further detail to
be looked at and further subtle distinctions to be made. Each distinction that is made
provides the possibility for further disagreement, and so the net result is that
academics naturally form themselves into a large number of camps, each with a very
small number of people in them.
3 Such fragmentation on the basis of small
differences is an anathema to achieving the kind of political or systemic changes that
are usually required by the practical aim. As political movements typically require an
agreed platform that many people from a variety of different perspectives can sign up
to, successful political arguments are usually not too speciﬁc and are nearly always
signiﬁcantly vaguer than fully articulated positions in theoretical bioethics are.
4
Given this lack of congruence between the theoretical and the practical aims, it is
natural to ask two questions. First, a question of scope: do both the practical and the
theoretical aims fall within the scope of bioethics proper? (Of course, even if it were
agreed that at least the core of both aims did fall inside bioethics proper, there would
be room for further debate about whether there are elements of each that fall outside,
and belong, say, to normative ethical theory on the one side or to political lobbying
on the other side.) Second, assuming that at least a core of both the theoretical and the
practical aims fall within bioethics proper, which should have the higher priority?
Questions such as these about the boundaries and purpose of disciplines embody
only in a fairly superﬁcial sense factual disputes about what most practitioners of the
discipline would consider to be the boundaries of the discipline, and which types of
questions they consider to be most important. In a deeper sense they are normative
questions about how best to advance the discipline, considered as a a tradition in
MacIntyre’s sense, as ‘‘an historically extended, socially embodied argument, and
2 The point here is not that the Taskforce made the right decision, but the more general one that there can
be a signiﬁcant gap between what ethical arguments, considered acontextually, would seem to
recommend, and what is the best thing to do all things considered in a particular richly described context.
3 On this point, see the useful discussion of the ‘‘narcissism of minor difference’’ in Wolff (2012,
pp. 1–6).
4 Montgomery (2013) explores some of these issues in greater depth. He argues that we should
distinguish between academic bioethics and ‘public ethics’, with public ethics being the branch that aims
to bring about political and regulatory change.
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p. 222).
Bioethics was transformed by one such set of arguments in the early years of this
century, expanding from a discipline that examined primarily ‘Promethean’ new
technologies and relationships between healthcare professionals and lay persons in
wealthy countries, to one that is global in its outlook and focuses as much on
institutions as individuals, and as much on the social determinants of health as on
healthcare.
5 What was determinative in this case was the sense that existing
bioethics frameworks had overlooked (and were poorly equipped to deal with) large
swathes of ethical questions connected to health and healthcare, including the social
determinants of health and disease, the ethics of healthcare rationing, and the ethics
of infectious disease.
This paper aims to start a different kind of reﬂexive conversation about the future
of bioethics, focused not so much on which topics should be inside and which
should be outside of bioethics, but about why we are doing bioethics, and what
would count as doing it well. Just as in the case of the shift to a more institutional
and global focus, the changes required are unlikely to follow clearly from a
conceptual analysis of the idea of bioethics alone, or from taking a poll of what
current individual bioethicists think that it is for, but by the gradual accretion of
evidence of unsolved problems and missed opportunities, and a careful construction
of a new and more fruitful framework. Hence, one of the main contributions of this
article is to fashion an understanding of bioethics that allows us to see the
theoretical and practical aims as interlinked and mutually supporting parts of a
continuum rather than in antagonism to each other.
A few preliminary comments are in order before we turn to the constructive task.
First, regardless of the stance that one takes on the relative importance of the
theoretical versus the practical aims, it should be common ground that much work in
bioethics is in fact motivated by a desire to mitigate or resolve ethical problems that
have been made salient by changes in the lived environment. Perhaps a new
procedure such as transplantation of mitochondrial DNA becomes available, which
plausibly raises ethical issues that have not so far been considered; or it becomes
apparent that antimicrobials are being (and have for some time been) used in an
unsustainable way for some time, and many thousands will die unless the problem is
brought under control.
6 So whilst there may be reasons in other areas of philosophy
for resisting the contamination of normative enquiry by practical concerns, and for
framing normative enquiry as pure truth seeking, in bioethics at least, claiming only
such a pure motivation would risk being disingenuous. Although the answers we seek
might conceivably be timeless and discoverable through a priori reasoning alone, the
questions that catch our attention are heavily inﬂuenced by our current concerns.
Second, whichever way one answers our two fundamental questions about
bioethics, it should also be common ground that responding wisely to challenging
5 For more on this turn, see e.g. Daniels (2006). I took some steps towards constructing a new framework
for thinking about public health ethics in Wilson (2009, 2011).
6 On mitochondrial DNA see e.g. Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics (2012), and on antimicrobial resistance
see e.g. Millar (2011).
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practical goal. Even if we were to conclude that bioethics, properly considered,
should have a purely theoretical aim, this would not make these pressing practical
ethical problems go away; it would simply mean that we then needed another
discipline or discourse that could translate between theoretical bioethics and these
practical problems. We can call this the translation problem. Given that these
practical ethical problems appear to be very signiﬁcant, adequately addressing the
translation problem would be important even if doing so fell outside of bioethics
proper.
The last thing to say by way of preliminary is that there are a set of deep
questions about the nature of ethics that bear on our two fundamental questions
about bioethics—for example, whether we should view ethics as fundamentally a
theoretical pursuit that aims at the discovery of normative truths, or whether we
should think of ethics as a fundamentally practical endeavour that aims to solve
various problems of coordination necessary for sustained and complex human life.
I shall attempt to sidestep these deeper debates as far as is possible.
7 My aim is to
point out a set of problems that bioethics will need to solve regardless of whether
we view ethics as fundamentally theoretical or fundamentally practical, and to
provide a lens for thinking about these problems that will be attractive to thinkers
from both perspectives. I shall argue that regardless of whether changing the
world should form part of bioethics’s core aims, any plausible conception of
bioethics should be at least committed to informing ethical judgements about what
ought to be done in richly described real life cases. As much of the rest of the
article explores, getting individual real world cases right is likely to require the
kind of messy, complex and contextual work for which more abstract levels of
theorising can only provide limited guidance. So, even if one’s orientation in
bioethics is entirely towards the theoretical, questions about how to move between
judgements based on simple cases and judgements in complex cases will be of
central importance.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces various themes
from debates on innovation in healthcare research—in particular debates around
how to best connect up blue skies ‘basic’ research with practical innovations that
can improve human lives—as a way of reﬂecting on the relationship between the
theoretical and the practical aims in bioethics. It explains how a simple top-down
linear model of innovation has been replaced by a more complex translational
model, which recognises that innovations move along different pathways—both
from the more ‘basic’ to the more ‘applied’ but also from the more ‘applied’ to the
more ‘basic’. Section 3 adapts the translational model to bioethics—arguing that we
should replace the idea of an opposition between the theoretical and the practical
with the idea of a continuum from the most simple and abstract cases (thought
experiments) to the most concrete and complex cases (real world cases). Insights
need to travel in both directions along this continuum—both from the simpler and
7 It is perhaps worth remarking that it is not very clear what could count as non question-begging
evidence for the claim that ethics is fundamentally a theoretical as opposed to a practical endeavour (or
vice versa).
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more abstract. Section 4 examines some ways in which judgements that are correct
in simple cases can fail to translate into helpful insights about more complex cases.
Section 4.1 focuses on thought experiments, whilst Sect. 4.2 focuses on richer but
still highly simpliﬁed cases. Section 5 concludes by reﬂecting on the implications of
the analysis for the future of the discipline.
2 The linear model in healthcare research
Questions about the relationship between theoretical advances and practical beneﬁt
are particularly urgent in healthcare research, owing to the ubiquity of death and
suffering, the technical difﬁculty and expense of bringing new drugs to market, and
governments’ own sizeable investments in funding both healthcare research and the
successful treatments that result from it. So it is perhaps unsurprising that debate on
the relationship between the theoretical and the practical is louder, older and more
voluble in healthcare research than it is in bioethics, and contains a rich potential for
cross-fertilisation. Moreover, approaching the question of the relationship between
theory and practice in bioethics via debates about translational research in
healthcare has the advantage that it allows us to sidestep the dispute between
fundamentally theoretical and fundamentally practical approaches to ethics. By
starting from outside ethics, in a domain in which it is relatively uncontroversial that
there are theoretical facts that inquiry aims to discover, it becomes apparent that
even in this domain, it follows neither that more abstract theoretical truths are more
worthy of pursuit than more concrete ones, nor that inquiry should be guided by the
pursuit of theoretical truths alone.
8
World War II saw an unprecedented mobilisation of science for the war effort.
The US set up the Ofﬁce of Scientiﬁc Research and Development (OSRD) in 1941,
whose goal was ‘‘to coordinate, supervise, and conduct scientiﬁc research on the
problems underlying the development, production, and use of mechanisms and
devices of warfare’’, leading most notably to the Manhattan Project. As the war
drew to a close, the US government faced a choice about the future of science
funding: should it continue to funnel scientiﬁc research budgets towards short term
solutions for centrally chosen goals, or would it be better to let scientists pursue
their own endeavours without regard to practical application?
Vannevar Bush, the Director of OSRD, was tasked with answering this question.
The resulting report, Science: the endless frontier set the tone for much of the
8 Philip Kitcher has used similar thoughts to argue for an approach to priority-setting in science that he
calls ‘‘well-ordered science’’ (Kitcher 2001, 2011). Brieﬂy, the argument is that there are an inﬁnity of
possible theoretical problems that researchers could be working on at any one time, and however many
problems they solve, there will always be an inﬁnity remaining. Given this, it makes sense to think that
there should be some kinds of norms to guide enquiry, above and beyond merely seeking truths or well-
justiﬁed beliefs. Where there are an inﬁnity of truths to be discovered, it no longer seems adequate to
simply say ‘‘I’m seeking to discover truths’’. All human beings could do that all day every day until the
end of time, and it would still remain the case that there were an inﬁnity of unknown truths. As Dennett
(2006) explores, it is thus quite possible for large amounts of intellectual labour to be expended on
problems that whilst genuine, are not good uses of the limited resources that we have to devote to inquiry.
8 J. Wilson
123approach to science funding over the next thirty years. Bush began from a
distinction between basic and applied research:
Basic research is performed without thought of practical ends. It results in
general knowledge and an understanding of nature and its laws. This general
knowledge provides the means of answering a large number of important
practical problems, though it may not give a complete speciﬁc answer to any
one of them. The function of applied research is to provide such complete
answers. (Bush 1945: Chapter 3.3)
Bush argued forcefully that it is the role of governments to support basic research,
and that basic research is best undertaken in universities. Applied research, he
argued, was better undertaken by businesses. It was crucial to his account that
investing in basic science will (although in ways we cannot yet predict) have
signiﬁcant payoffs in the future:
One of the peculiarities of basic science is the variety of paths which lead to
productive advance. Many of the most important discoveries have come as a
result of experiments undertaken with very different purposes in mind.
Statistically it is certain that important and highly useful discoveries will result
from some fraction of the undertakings in basic science; but the results of any
one particular investigation cannot be predicted with accuracy. (Bush 1945:
Chapter 3.3)
The idea that theoretical work produces practical beneﬁts—but in unexpected ways
that it would be counterproductive to attempt to second-guess—is also at the heart
of certain defences of philosophy that emphasise its long-term impact, but deny that
this impact could usefully be measured or optimised in the short term.
9 Of course,
one obvious disanalogy is that, when compared to science, there is a decided lack of
concerted action in either the commercial sector or in civil society to translate the
results of basic normative or other philosophical work into commercialisable or
socially beneﬁcial results (though the use of game theory in management
consultancy and elsewhere might be a possible analogue).
Bush’s approach to innovation was ampliﬁed and extended by a number of other
ﬁgures over the next 20 years (as summarised for example, by Godin 2006 and
Balconi et al. 2010), and the resulting approach to thinking about innovation has
come to be known as the linear model. The linear model, at its most radical makes
the following assumptions about how innovative products such as new drugs come
to be invented:
(1.1) A clear distinction can be drawn between basic (scientiﬁc) and applied
(technological and industrial) research… (1.2) Basic or fundamental or prior
scientiﬁc research is the main or rather the unique source of technical
innovation… (1.3) New knowledge acquired through basic research trickles
down, almost automatically, to applied research, technology and innovations,
even within short time spans. (Balconi et al. 2010,p .5 )
9 See for example, British Philosophical Association (2009), Bovens and Cartwright (2010).
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(1997) argues, scientiﬁc research projects cannot be divided neatly into those that
aim to discover fundamental truths about the ways things are, and those that aim at
practical application. Some forms of research aim both at practical applicability and
at discovering fundamental laws. Louis Pasteur’s work, which aimed to address
practical questions such as how to avoid milk and beer spoiling, but answered these
questions by making fundamental discoveries such as the germ theory of disease, is
a key exemplar of this (Stokes 1997, pp. 12–13).
10
The idea that advances in basic science are always necessary for improved
technologies—in Bush’s words, that ‘‘basic research is the pacemaker of
technological progress,’’ (1945: Chapter 3.3) has also been challenged. Whilst
there are obvious cases where new therapies have been developed out of a
bedrock of advances in basic science (such as monoclonal antibodies), it is
implausible to claim that healthcare innovation always starts from advances in
basic science. Indeed, inﬂuential innovation scholars such as Kline and
Rosenberg (1986, p. 288) argue that innovation led by basic research is the
exception, rather than the rule.
Third, the idea that new basic science automatically leads to changes in medical
practice that beneﬁt patients is also highly questionable. The history of medical
science is littered with examples of failures to properly connect basic and applied
science. Even a case such as the discovery of penicillin, which might initially seem
to be an obvious success story, shows how contingent takeup of basic science into
applied science can be.
11
As a result of the shortcomings of the linear model, a consensus has grown within
healthcare research that funders and researchers need to think in systemic terms
about how the different stages of research from the most basic science to the most
applied can best ﬁt together, an approach to thinking that has come to be known as
translational research. As translational research developed, it became increasingly
apparent that optimising the beneﬁts to patients from research spending requires a
rigorous and systematic focus on the pathways and transitions between the different
stages of healthcare research, looking for bottlenecks and other opportunities to
improve research efﬁciency.
10 It is a little harder to see what an ethics example of something that fell into what Stokes describes as
‘‘Pasteur’s Quadrant’’ would be like: what would work look like that succeeded in clarifying
simultaneously a fundamental normative or theoretical concept, and which had an important practical
implication in the way that we live our lives? One possibility might be Parﬁt’s (1984) discussion of the
non-identity problem; another might be Glover’s (1975) refutation of the claim that it is only harms that
are noticeable which matter morally.
11 Fleming discovered the antibiotic properties of penicillin by accident in 1928 in the course of his basic
research. He published the discovery, and even went as far as to use it to treat a colleague’s conjunctivitis,
but was unable to interest his colleagues in it. (Fleming 1929; Le Fanu 2011). Finding little takeup for the
idea of penicillin’s therapeutic use, and having failed to ﬁnd a way of concentrating it, he abandoned the
project. (Ligon 2004) It was only ten years later that Florey and Chain chanced on Fleming’s paper, and
undertook an animal trial, which showed penicillin to be effective in mice, and the potential beneﬁt for
human life became obviously apparent.
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Worries about the lack of direct connection between progress in basic theory and
progress in answering more concrete questions apply even more strongly in
bioethics than in healthcare research. As Section 1 explored, it is plausible to think
that much high quality work in abstract normative theory has very little practical
impact, and as we shall see, searching questions can also be asked about current
efﬁciency in moving between ethical questions at different points of the continuum
between the fully abstract and fully concrete.
In order to be able to talk sensibly about efﬁciency in translation between basic
and applied contexts in a domain, we need at least a rough model of the continuum
of different levels at which research questions can be asked and answered in that
domain, and different potential ways of moving between them. Once we have such a
model it is much easier to determine whether research insights are currently moving
between these different levels as effectively as they could be.
Bioethicists do not often ask questions about research efﬁciency in their
discipline, or explicitly address the question of how best to move between different
levels of abstraction in ethical thinking, and so again the healthcare research
literature will provide a starting-point. As Table 1 indicates, we can divide the
journey from the most basic science to interventions that actually beneﬁt patients
into ﬁve stages.
12 If an intervention that beneﬁts patients is to be derived from basic
science, it must pass through each of these stages.
13 Given the uncontroversial focus
in healthcare research prioritisation on the beneﬁts to actual patients that are
achieved at stage 5, the model immediately raises questions about research funding
priorities if it turns out that prioritising basic science is a markedly less efﬁcient way
of achieving patient beneﬁt than, say, research-led improvement of doctors’
prescribing habits.
The model begins from the observation that much basic research—for example
the discovery that a particular protein has a role in regulating inﬂammation—does
not have obvious or immediate clinical application. It may take signiﬁcant amounts
of work to come up with a potential clinical application. The ﬁrst main place in
which there can be failures of translation is thus in moving from (1) basic science to
(2) proof of concept in a potential clinical application. The journey from (2) proof of
concept to (3) proof of efﬁcacy, i.e. that the intervention works under idealised and
controlled conditions, is long and arduous. There are many sites along this journey
at which translation could potentially be improved, including better understanding
of the limits of animal models, better research regulation, speedier marketing
approval and so on. Once there is proof of efﬁcacy, the next main stage is proof that
the intervention will be safe and be more effective than its competitors in real world
12 The translational research literature contains a number of different conceptualisations of this
continuum. For an overview of this debate, and a nuanced response to it, see Drolet and Lorenzi (2011).
13 Of course (and acknowledging this was key to the shift away from the linear model), innovations that
beneﬁt patients can also have rather different trajectories. Healthcare innovations need not travel ‘‘from
the bench to the bedside’’, but may instead travel ‘‘from the bedside to the bench’’ (Marincola 2003).
Other important innovations can come from organising things better within a given stage of research (for
example by reducing administrative delays in setting up clinical trials).
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lives by itself—so we can think of the ﬁnal hurdle as the journey from proof of
effectiveness (4) to patients being beneﬁted by the intervention being adopted into
standard clinical practice (5).
We can construct a roughly parallel trajectory for bioethics, tracing the kind of
steps that would need to occur if new insights in basic normative theory were to lead
to ethical improvements on the ground.
14 As in the case of healthcare research, the
idea is not to say that moral change inevitably follows this trajectory or that it
should, but rather to allow us to use the model to ask questions about where time
and other resources are currently being concentrated along this path, and whether
transitions between different elements could be improved. As this is a ﬁrst shot at
constructing such a trajectory, it is likely that much could be improved.
First, we can take discussion of normative theory without any attempt to think
about its applicability to be analogous to basic science. Normative theory of this
kind will encompass questions such as what sorts of things are intrinsically valuable,
the degree of commensurability of different intrinsic values, the range of different
appropriate responses to things that are intrinsically valuable—whether all should
be promoted for instance, or whether there are some that should be respected.
15
Perhaps back in the early days of bioethics, it might have seemed plausible to
think that we would be able to step straight from basic normative theory to claims
about what should be done in the real world. But this possibility now seems
Table 1 The translational continuum in healthcare research and in bioethics
Stage Healthcare research stage Bioethics equivalent
1 Basic science Discussion of normative theory without any
attempt to think about the applicability of
moral theory to real life cases
2 Proof of concept—e.g. Phase 0 trial, testing
pharmacodynamics and pharmacokinetics of
drug to see that it could in principle be an
effective therapy
Working out what ought to be done in thought
experiments
3 Proof of efﬁcacy—e.g. Phase 2 and 3 trials,
demonstrating that the drug has a clinical
effect under idealised conditions
Working out what ought to be done in
simpliﬁed but somewhat realistic cases
4 Proof of effectiveness e.g. Pragmatic trial, to
determine the effectiveness of the drug in
real world clinical settings
Working out what we should do, all things
considered, in real world situations
5 Implementation e.g. Policy changes, supported
by healthcare research to beneﬁt patients
Policy changes or other actions to make the
world closer to how it should be
14 My thoughts on the relationship between theory and practice in ethics have been enriched by a number
of conversations over the years with Alan Cribb (see Cribb 2010, 2011). Cribb (2010) ﬂoated the idea of a
translational ethics, but treated it merely as a ‘‘heuristic device’’, to facilitate reﬂection on the broader
project of ‘‘translating ethical scholarship into policy or practice’’ (2010, p. 207). This paper takes the
idea of translational ethics seriously and more literally as a future path for bioethics.
15 For an overview of some of these debates, see Schroeder (2012).
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16 The continued deep and unresolved disagreements about matters of
fundamental moral theory mean that even if it is clear what a particular moral theory
would advise in a given case, knowing this does little to help us decide what to do
when other undefeated moral theories recommend something else. Moreover, it has
also become clear that moral theories lack the speciﬁcity to give us a deﬁnitive steer
on many practical questions: as in the case of basic science, it will often take
considerable work to develop a claim in fundamental normative theory to a point
where it has clear implications for practice, even in idealised cases.
Thought experiments play a key bridging role in crossing the continuum between
basic normative theory and judgements about real world cases. Thought
experiments as I understand them here are toy philosophical cases that are designed
to simplify a philosophical problem along a number of dimensions, thus making the
problem more philosophically tractable. Like real-world experiments, their aim is to
test a hypothesis, or to establish a point of principle—though the hypothesis or point
of principle is an ethical one in the case of bioethical thought experiments. Thought
experiments can be used to try to support or to undermine claims in basic normative
theory, but they are also used as a controlled test environment for judgements about
more complex and more realistic cases. As Frances Kamm explains it, ‘‘Real-life
cases often do not contain the relevant—or solely the relevant—characteristics to
help in our search for principles. If our aim is to discover the relative weight of, say,
two factors, we should consider cases that involve only these two factors, perhaps
artiﬁcially, rather than distract ourselves with other factors and options’’ (Kamm
1993, p. 7).
In the next section, I focus on some of the potential difﬁculties involved in
moving from thought experiments to judgements about more complex cases, and
from more complex cases to what should be done all things considered. However, it
is important to notice that the main point of the model that I am proposing is that we
need to think more rigorously and more systematically about how best to move
between different levels of complexity in the analysis of ethical problems. Similar
questions can and should be asked about moving from simpler to more complex
cases on other parts of the continuum, about moving from complex cases to other
cases of similar complexity, and about the implications of judgements about richly
described complex cases for judgements about simpler and more abstract cases—
points I return to in Sect. 5.
4 Moving from simpler to more complex cases
4.1 Internal and external validity in thought experiments
Thought experiments in bioethics are usually different in a number of salient aspects
from the real world scenarios in which actual moral agents make their choices.
16 On this point, see for example Caplan (1983), and the critique of the ‘‘engineering model’’ of applied
ethics therein.
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also make simpliﬁcations 5 and 6:
1. Authoritative ethical framing: the case raises the ethical question that the author
of the thought experiment says it does. What the ethical issue is that the case
raises is not subject to dispute.
2. Conﬁned choices: choices must be made from a short predeﬁned menu, with no
ability to alter the terms of the problem. What counts as a viable response to the
problem is stipulated by the author of the thought experiment, and is not up for
discussion. The world of the thought experiment may operate according to laws
that are plainly false of the real world. Hence, responses that would be likely to
be effective in real world analogues of the thought experiment may be
stipulated not to work, and other responses, which would be unlikely to be
effective in real world analogues, may be stipulated to be effective.
3. Certainty of effect: each of the deﬁned choices will bring about its stipulated
effect with certainty. It is possible to identify in advance who will beneﬁt, and
who will lose, from each of the predeﬁned choices. Where the choice is
stipulated to bring about the desired effect a certain percentage of the time,
these stipulated probabilities are entirely accurate.
4. Ceteris paribus: no morally relevant differences other than those which have
been stipulated by the framer of the thought experiment apply to the situation.
5. Small numbers: the case is presented as one involving either single individuals,
or groups of no more than ﬁve, even if the ﬁnal desired aim is to make
recommendations about situations involving large groups of people.
6. Atomicity: the case stands entirely on its own. There is no relevant history that
affects judgements about the case, and no relevant future policy implications of
making one decision rather than another.
Although the problem is not usually discussed in these terms, it is apparent that, just
like clinical trials, the use of thought experiments can suffer from problems of
internal and external validity. A clinical experiment is internally valid if it is
designed in such a way that it correctly measures the causal effect of an independent
variable or variables on one or more dependent variables. Doing so requires trial
designers to avoid bias and confounding factors. Maintaining internal validity is the
main reason for the shift towards randomised controlled trials. Similarly, a thought
experiment is internally valid to the extent that it allows its readers to make
judgements that are conﬁdent and free of bias about the hypothesis or point of
principle that it aims to test. Thus for example, if the thought experiment requires
comparing two cases which differ only in a single respect, we need to be conﬁdent
that the cases do only differ in this one respect; and if the framer of the thought
experiment claims that only one of the stipulated choices in the case is morally
permissible, we should be able to judge conﬁdently that this is true.
An experiment trial has external validity in addition to internal validity to the
extent that the causal effects demonstrated in it can be generalised to a wide range of
other situations. Within the ﬁelds of healthcare and public policy research, the
relationship between internal and external validity has increasingly come into the
14 J. Wilson
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highly idealised context of a controlled trial may not be effective in other contexts
(Rothwell 2005). As Cartwright (2013) puts it, a randomised controlled trial (RCT)
can show that an intervention worked somewhere but not that it will work here. To
describe a trial as lacking in external validity is not by itself to impugn its quality as
research: it is in the nature of an RCT that the rigour in experimental design that is
necessary for internal validity sets limits on how, if at all, the results can be
extrapolated to other contexts (Cartwright 2007). However, research that lacks
external validity will be useful for changing the world only in a narrow range of
contexts.
Similarly, we can say that a thought experiment has external validity in addition
to internal validity to the extent that points of principle that are established by it can
be generalised to a wide range of other circumstances. Thought experiments, and
normative arguments more broadly, can lack external validity in at least two ways.
First, if the principles they establish presuppose factual circumstances that are
relevantly different from those that currently obtain. For example, Nozick’s
entitlement theory of property rights is often thought to lack external validity on
these grounds of factual irrelevance. The theory requires that property is justly held
if and only if it was either (a) justly initially acquired or (b) legitimately transferred
from someone else who was already entitled to it. Even leaving on one side the
kinds of difﬁculties that can be raised to Nozick’s account of just acquisition, it is
clear that there have been massive and systematic ruptures in justice in transfer
throughout human history, including wars, colonialism, slavery, and the genocidal
destruction of ﬁrst nation peoples. Even if goods have been transferred legitimately
since the time when they were unjustly acquired, Nozick’s view would not imply
that they are now justly held. Rather such goods would be subject to a principle of
justice in rectiﬁcation—a principle that Nozick does not specify. So despite initial
appearances, Nozick’s account tells us virtually nothing about who is entitled to
what, or what could be legitimately taken from whom and redistributed to others, in
our world with its particular history. To his credit, Nozick himself recognises the
problem, and admits that his theory would require a full account of justice in
rectiﬁcation, which he is unable to offer, stating that ‘‘in the absence of such a
treatment applied to a particular society, one cannot use the analysis and theory
presented here to condemn any particular scheme of transfer payments, unless it is
clear that no considerations of rectiﬁcation of injustice could apply to justify it’’
17
Nozick (1975, p. 231).
Second, ethical principles and considerations are often claimed to interact with
one another in holistic ways. On this view, there are scenarios in which ethical
considerations that favour acting in certain ways in many or most cases no longer
provide a reason in favour of acting in that way, and may even change polarity and
provide a reason against acting in that way. For example, in usual circumstances, the
fact that doing X will provide someone else with pleasure speaks in favour of it, but
there are readily imaginable scenarios where the fact that something will create
17 Nozick’s argument presents a particularly clear case of a factual failure of external validity—but it is a
problem to which theories such as luck egalitarianism are also notoriously vulnerable.
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view has the implication that even if we have an internally valid thought
experiment, it would not follow that the principle established by the thought
experiment will make the same contribution in other cases. So even if we have two
precisely matched cases that differ only in one respect—say that one is a doing, and
the other an allowing (as Rachels 1975 aims to do)—and establish that in this
precisely controlled pair of cases, the factor that contrasts between the two cases
does not make a moral difference, it would not follow that this factor will not make
a moral difference in other cases.
The alternative to this holistic view seems to be to make the equally substantive
and controversial assumption that each morally relevant factor makes its contri-
bution to the overall ethical reasons in play independently from all other factors.
Such a view, which Kagan (1988) calls the additive assumption, would (if true)
provide a solid justiﬁcation of the external validity of thought experiments in ethics.
However, the fact that the additive assumption is itself highly controversial and has
been subjected to many purported counterexamples, suggests that it would make
work in bioethics less rather than more rigorous if bioethicists were to presuppose
its truth in doing ethical reasoning.
Refusing to grant the additive assumption would place the external validity of
thought experiments in ethics on a par with that of randomised clinical trials. In
neither case would there be a logical entailment between internal validity and
external validity. The failure of this logical entailment does not imply that
randomised clinical trials cannot be externally valid, and would not imply that
thought experiments in ethics cannot be externally valid. So to abandon the additive
assumption is not say that the use of thought experiments should be (even could be)
abandoned in bioethics, but rather to suggest that bioethicists need to be aware that
even rigorously designed thought experiments may not show what their designers
think they do and that consequently bioethicists need to be on the look out for, and
to expect, defeaters that prevent translation from one context to another.
18
One key question is whether there are some kinds of thought experiments that are
more likely to lack external validity than others. Elster (2011) argues convincingly
that outlandish thought experiments (involving, say, individuals with two-hundred
arms) are much more likely to fail to be externally valid. In order to be conﬁdent
that the thought experiment is externally valid, its readers need to be able to imagine
in sufﬁcient detail not only the outlandish elements of the thought experiment, but
also the implications of the outlandish elements for ethical norms and practice
within the world of the thought experiment. Given that thought experiments are
usually very brieﬂy described, there is much that can go wrong here: something that
the author intended to be imaginable, such as a human being with arms so long they
can reach from one end of India to the other
19 may not really be really imaginable,
18 Thanks for Simon Rippon for pushing me to be clearer on this point.
19 See Kamm (2006, p. 352) for this thought experiment: ‘‘Suppose that I stand in a part of India, but I
have very long arms that reach all the way to the other end of India, allowing me to reach a child who is
drowning in a pond at a great distance (Reach Case). Intuitively, I think that this case is treated as one
where the child is near.’’
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20 Even if a world containing
such creatures is genuinely and stably imaginable, it may well be that taking the
outlandish elements of the thought experiment seriously would entail such profound
changes to other aspects of ethical life that there is little reason to think that ethical
claims that are true of that world are transferable to our world.
4.2 Ethical arguments and what should be done all things considered
Much work in bioethics analyses cases that are richer than thought experiments but
still involve a number of important simpliﬁcations when compared to the real world.
Presumably the hope is that whilst such cases are signiﬁcantly simpliﬁed, it will
nonetheless be reasonable to assume that the case discussed is realistic enough to
have clear implications for what should be done all things considered in actual
cases, and that the greater richness of the examples discussed will help to evade
some of the problems of external validity that can affect thought experiments.
Examples of this strategy would be examining the moral permissibility of an action
type such as organ sales in the abstract, or analysing the validity of a particular
argument against commercial surrogacy (say that it constitutes the selling of
babies).
One worry about the external validity of this type of strategy, as I explore in more
detail in Wilson (2009), is that it is much more difﬁcult to justify conclusions about
what ought to be done all things considered on the basis of philosophical analysis of
arguments than some bioethicists seem to assume. For example, even if it could be
adequately established that given valid consent and appropriate background
conditions, sale of one’s organs is morally permissible, there is a long journey
from this claim to the conclusion that therefore organ sale should be legalised. In
scenarios closer to real life, the risks of exploitation, organ theft, crowding out of
altruistic donation, transplant tourism or of black markets may be sufﬁciently high
that we judge that it would not be justiﬁable to legalise organ sales, despite the fact
that we can conceive of an idealised situation in which organ sales might be morally
permissible.
21
Focusing on the validity and soundness of ethical arguments is an indispensable
tool for bioethicists. My claim is not that focusing on the quality of arguments is a
bad way of doing bioethics, but that analyses of ethical arguments can be rigorous in
the sense of attending carefully to the meaning of the terms and the pattern of
logical inferences used, but yet still fail to be informative about what should be done
all things considered. Just like thought experiments, more realistic cases can also
suffer from problems of external validity.
20 It seems from the context that Kamm (2006, p. 352) intends that the extra-long arms be an integrated
part of the individual’s body. This raises a number of challenges for imagining the case: is the rest of the
person supposed to be scaled up in proportion to their thousand-mile long arms? The context suggests not.
But if we are supposed to imagine an ordinary-sized human being with arms a thousand miles long, how
is their anatomy supposed to work? How much would thousand-mile long arms weigh? How would the
weight be supported? How would it be possible for them to perform everyday tasks such as dressing
themselves, taking a shower, or eating a sandwich?
21 For a nuanced account, which attempts to examine these factors and more, see Cohen (2013).
Theory, cases and the future of bioethics 17
1235 Conclusion: embracing complexity
We started from an apparent tension between the theoretical and the practical aims
of bioethics, and two questions. First, a question about whether both the practical
and the theoretical aims should fall within the scope of bioethics proper. Second, a
question about which of the two aims should have higher priority. We are now in a
position to answer and to reframe these questions.
The ﬁrst question can be answered brieﬂy. Normative theory without any thought
to application (stage 1) is not a part of bioethics but of normative ethics more
abstractly conceived. Any attempt to make normative judgements about cases (from
thought experiments (stage 2) to real world cases (stage 4)) should uncontroversially
be. Making correct (or at least well justiﬁed) moral judgements about cases becomes
more complex the closer these cases approach to the real world. But this complexity
seems no reason to draw the boundaries of bioethics in such a way that the questions
it deals with are always simple. The world in which we act as moral agents is, after
all, complex; and bioethics gains much of its practical impetus from the attempt to
help provide normative guidance in this world. So there is little reason to think that
the boundaries of bioethics should stop short of including making wise judgements
about complex individual cases.
Once one has determined what is ethically required all things considered in
response to a real world situation, and if one has at least some power to inﬂuence the
situation, it would be odd to think that this had no implications for what one should
do. I thus ﬁnd it difﬁcult to deny that if a bioethicist comes to a particular conclusion
about a real world case on the basis of a careful analysis of the relevant reasons, and
then seeks to change the world on the basis of this analysis (by means such as
arguing for the view publicly) that they do what they do as a bioethicist. So, at least
where the means used are rational persuasion, stage 5 is very plausibly a core part of
bioethics.
On the second question, we can now see that the supposed opposition between
the theoretical and the practical aims of bioethics from which we started is
misleading. Theoretical questions in ethics form a continuum from the simplest
questions such as whether knowledge or pleasure is valuable in itself, to the most
complex, such as what ought to be done, and by whom, to combat the rise of
antimicrobial resistance.
22 Working out what ethical duties are held and by whom in
a real world case is still a theoretical question, and like the simplest questions about
cases involving one value in isolation, requires us to bring together relevant
theoretical claims with situational judgement. The main difference is that as we
travel across the continuum in one way, more and more of the messiness and
complexity of the real world is bracketed for simplicity, and in the other way, more
and more of the messiness and complexity of the real world is revealed.
Hence, even focusing entirely on bioethics as a theoretical rather than a practical
pursuit gives no reason in itself to think that the examination of simpler and more
abstract cases is more important than messier and more complex ones. A further
argument would be needed for this claim. The key question could be rephrased as
22 On the complexity of AMR as an ethical problem, see for example Littmann (2014).
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the way of us getting a grip on what is really going on, ethically speaking, or
whether this messiness and complexity is what is going on, ethically speaking.
Many philosophers assume, implicitly if not explicitly, that the former view is
correct.
23 This assumption makes it seem natural that, other things being equal,
work on simpler and more abstract problems will be more fruitful for the discipline,
given that such work appears to give rise to principles that will apply to a wider
variety of cases, whilst analyses of richly described real world cases seem to tell us
only about that particular case.
We have seen that, given the implausibility of the linear model, things are likely
to be more complicated than this. Principles established through apparently rigorous
abstract work may fail to have external validity. Analysis of rich cases can
themselves have important theoretical implications: for example, they may bring out
problems or contradictions that went unnoticed in a more abstract model. Analysis
of real world cases can also be more widely useful to the practice of bioethics
through the power of example: seeing how complex and contested empirical
material bears on what should be done in one ethical problem may be useful in
determining how complex and contested empirical material bears on a different
ethical problem.
24 As in the case of healthcare research, it seems plausible to
assume that determining which are the better, and which the worse, ways of moving
between simpler and more complex research problems is itself a complex research
problem—a problem that this paper has introduced, but not solved.
What follows from this analysis for the future of bioethics? Perhaps the main
lesson is that work in bioethics can fail to be rigorous in two distinct ways. In
explaining this I made use of the concepts of internal and external validity. First,
work in bioethics can be shoddy on its own terms: thought experiments can be
poorly equalised, distinctions made inexactly, arguments vague or fallacious.
Second, work that is rigorous on its own terms can be unhelpful, or misleading, if
authors extrapolate its lessons to other cases without due attention to the factors that
could undermine external validity. Bioethics journals are full of attempts to do
research that is rigorous in the ﬁrst sense, and to expose cases where others have
done research that is not rigorous in this sense. But as yet there is very little written
on, and little attention to, rigour in the second sense. If bioethics is going provide a
useful basis for improving the world, this needs to change.
Two brief suggestions for the future. First, bioethicists should be clearer and
more explicit about the implications (if any) that they think that their arguments
about simpler cases have for other more complex cases. They should not make
23 See for example, GA Cohen’s demand that the subject matter of political philosophy be the search for
fact-free fundamental principles of justice: ‘‘facts are irrelevant in the determination of fundamental
principles of justice. Facts of human nature and human society of course (1) make a difference to what
justice tells us to do in speciﬁc terms; they also (2) tell us how much justice we can get; and they (3) bear
on how much we should compromise with justice, but, so I believe, they make no difference to the very
nature of justice itself.’’ (2008, p. 285).
24 For a good example of this approach in action, see Thacher (2006), who uses rich empirical work on
city design and grassroots political activism to show how such concrete work can reveal values, and value
conﬂicts, that would otherwise be missed.
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policy implications to be taken seriously.
25 Second, bioethics needs a literature on
how best to move between different levels of complexity, both on what counts as
good practice in this area, and what is required to train the next generation of
bioethicists. Over to you.
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